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FEDERAL JUVENILE WAIVER PRACTICES:
A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE CONSIDERATION OF
PRIOR DELINQUENCY RECORDS
Randie P. Ullman
INTRODUCTION
Courts today are filled with stories of troubled youth and the crime
and violence they are increasingly involved in. Sixteen-year-old
TLW,' for example, was arrested and charged with four counts of
distribution of crack and cocaine.2 But behind the seriousness of the
crimes he committed lies an unstable personal history. TLW's cousin
had recruited him to sell cocaine when TLW was only fourteen?
TLW's biological father was a convicted drug dealer and his mother
was mentally ill.' TLW's closest family connection was to his
grandfather, who passed away when TLW was only thirteen.5 At the
time of his arrest, TLW had no legal guardian and admitted to having
no significant emotional relationship with anyone.6 TLW's troubled
social history, compounded with at least eighteen prior delinquency
offenses ranging from aggravated assault to traffic violations, made
him an ideal candidate for waiver in the federal juvenile justice
system.' The United States District Court for the Central District of
Illinois made the difficult decision to transfer TLW to adult status in
the interest of justice.'
The TLW story is just one of many American juvenile tragedies that
raise the question of how our criminal justice system should treat
children who commit violent adult crimes. For many legislatures, the
answer is waiver to adult status. When a juvenile is waived to adult
status, he or she is tried as a criminal defendant, and an adult sentence
may be imposed. Adult sentences often result in incarceration in
institutions filled with adult criminals who further corrupt and take
1. TLW are the juvenile's initials, which are often used in federal juvenile court
proceedings to protect the confidentiality of the juvenile defendant.
2. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (C.D. I11.1996), aff'd sub
nom, United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
3. See id at 1402.
4. See id
5. See id
6. See id
7. See id. at 1403-04.
8. See id. at 1404.
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advantage of juvenile inmates. These institutions do little to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders. In the federal system, the decision of
whether to waive a juvenile to adult status rests on judicial discretion,
though federal law directs district court judges to consider a variety of
factors in making this determination.9 One such factor is a juvenile's
prior delinquency record. 10
Courts' interpretations of "prior
delinquency" have been far from uniform, however, with some courts
holding that a juvenile's prior record consists solely of adjudicated
conduct and others including all prior police contacts. Courts that
restrict their analysis to adjudicated conduct consider only arrests that
resulted in convictions, while courts that define "prior delinquency
records" to include all prior police contacts consider all complaints,
arrests, and convictions that have been documented by law
enforcement officials in the particular juvenile's history.
This Note argues that a uniform federal standard must be adopted
to prevent waiving juveniles with rehabilitative potential to adult
status. Courts should not only consider all prior police contacts, but
should allow attorneys to investigate the circumstances surrounding
those prior contacts. When a prosecutor argues for waiver, the
defense attorney should be able to provide the district court judge
with a contextual analysis of the juvenile's prior delinquency record.
For example, extenuating circumstances such as an influential family
member who recruits a juvenile to commit the alleged offense makes
the juvenile less culpable and therefore less appropriate for transfer
than a juvenile who undertook criminal activity on his own. Likewise,
the prosecutor should be permitted to show that the juvenile was in
fact a ringleader or otherwise especially culpable. After considering
all prior police contacts, district court judges will be able to make a
more informed decision about the individual juvenile and the
appropriateness of adjudication as an adult.
In arguing for a uniform definition of a juvenile's prior delinquency
record, this Note focuses on the federal juvenile justice system, but
often looks to state juvenile systems for comparison and support. Part
I provides a historical overview of juvenile justice and surveys the
pertinent Supreme Court decisions that have shaped procedural due
process in juvenile proceedings. Part I also explores America's
movement away from the traditional rehabilitative approach to
delinquency toward the predominantly punitive juvenile justice
system currently emerging.
Part II describes the process of
transferring juveniles to adult criminal status, known as judicial
waiver, and discusses the impact of punitive reforms on waiver
practices. Part II then presents the competing definitions federal
judges assign to a juvenile's prior delinquency record when conducting
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994).

10. See id.
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transfer hearings. Part III urges courts to define a juvenile's prior
delinquency record to include all prior police contacts, thereby
minimizing the likelihood that federal courts will treat similarly
situated juvenile defendants differently. It further argues that
attorneys should be able to present the court with extenuating
circumstances surrounding prior police contacts. Part III concludes
with a discussion of the future of juvenile justice in America and
proposes the adoption of interim remedies to improve the federal
system until Congress can draft effective legislation.
I. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: FROM
REHABILITATION TO PUNISHMENT
Juvenile justice has undergone extreme transformation throughout
United States history. This part describes the evolution of the
juvenile court system and the different philosophies that have shaped
our nation's approach to juvenile justice. It then surveys the major
Supreme Court due process decisions that have mandated specific
protections in juvenile court, and discusses the impact that these
decisions have had on the overall functioning of the juvenile system.
Finally, this part analyzes the current trend toward a punishmentoriented approach to juvenile delinquency, and presents opposing
viewpoints on whether a separate juvenile justice system should be
abolished.
A. A HistoricalOverview of the American Juvenile Justice System
In the early nineteenth century, juveniles deemed delinquent were
locked up with adult criminals and exposed to harsh adult prison
conditions." Convicts educated juveniles in the art of criminal activity
and consequently, juvenile crime rates continued to rise. 2 During the
late nineteenth century, rapid industrialization and urbanization led to
a nationwide increase in poverty, disease, and crime.1 3 In response to
these social control problems, the Progressive Movement emerged."4
The Progressives were greatly influenced by positivism, the theory

11. See Jack Klempner & Rodger D. Parker, Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile
Justice 8-9 (1981).
12- See id at 9. The mid-19th century also witnessed the creation of refuge houses
that eventually gave way to the creation of reform schools. For a thorough discussion
of the history of juvenile justice in America, see generally Clifford E. Simonsen and
Marshall S. Gordon III, Juvenile Justice in America (1979).
13. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 474
(1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Changes]; David J. Rothman, Conscience and
Convenience: The Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive America 206-07 (1980).
14. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 474; Sarah M. Cotton,
Comment, When the Punishment CannotFit the Crime. The Case for Reforming the
JuvenileJustice System, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 563, 565 (1999).
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that "antecedent causal variables produc[e] crime and deviance."' 5
Delinquent children were thus perceived as products of a corrupt
environment and were thought to be in need of greater structure and
supervision. 16 The Progressives spurred the development of a distinct
system of justice to treat juvenile offenders. 7 The juvenile court
movement removed juveniles from the criminal justice system and
placed them in a corrections system that focused on individual
rehabilitation. 8 Unlike the punishment-oriented criminal courts, the
juvenile system's objective was to determine the best interests of the
child.19 The juvenile court system thus replaced the punitive policies
of the criminal courts with a scientific and sociological approach to
rehabilitating juvenile delinquents.2"
Because progressive reformers saw the need to create a nonpunitive, therapeutic system of justice for children,2' they introduced
informal, flexible, open-ended policies that required juvenile court
judges to make discretionary decisions about how to treat juvenile
offenders.' Reformers believed that judges should act paternally and
discipline juveniles as they would their own children.23 This
philosophy gave rise to the legal concept of parens patriae, under
which the state is viewed as the guardian of its delinquent youth. 4 As
15. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 475. Positivism was a departure
from the classic perception that criminal behavior was the product of free will. See id.
16. See id. at 474. Progressives believed that juveniles were psychologically less
developed than adults and that consequently they "needed to complete their
cognitive, social, and moral development before being expected to shoulder the
burdens of adulthood." Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on
Juveniles: The ChangingIdeology of Youth Corrections,5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics &
Pub. Pol'y 323, 324 (1991). For an overview of the role of the Progressives in the
juvenile justice system, see generally Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The
Invention of Delinquency (2d ed. 1977).
17. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfidness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 68, 71-72 (1997)
[hereinafter Feld, Youthfulness].
18. See id.
19. See Robert C. Trojanowicz & Merry Morash, Juvenile Delinquency Concepts
and Control 140 (3d ed. 1983).
20. See Feld, Youthfulness, supra note 17, at 71-72.
21. See Marcia Johnson, Juvenile Justice, 17 Whittier L. Rev. 713, 718 (1996); see
also Jeffrey K. Day, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of
Rehabilitation, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 399, 402 (1992) (stating that the
Progressives saw the juvenile court as therapeutic); Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The
Delinquentand the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Placefor Rehabilitation?,25 Conn.
L. Rev. 57, 66 (1992) (discussing the view that society would benefit from the
rehabilitation of juveniles who have committed delinquent acts).
22. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 821, 823-24
(1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment].
23. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 718.
24. See Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Practice
and Law 308 (1981). "'Parens Patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers
traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under [a]
legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane ... and in child custody determinations,
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a result of these progressive reforms, Illinois established the first
juvenile court in 1899.' The court's primary purpose was to protect
children from the severe punishments imposed by adult criminal
courts and to serve as an alternative to incarceration in reform
schools. 2 Many states were quick to follow and by 1925, all but two
states had a juvenile court system in place. 7
In 1938, the federal government enacted legislation to facilitate the
prosecution of juvenile offenders in federal court.' The Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA)29 set forth a procedural framework
for the treatment of minors who violated a federal criminal statute °
The FJDA granted the Attorney General unlimited discretion to
prosecute a child under eighteen as a juvenile if that child had not
been surrendered to state officials or charged with an offense
punishable by death or life in prison."
Under the guise of parenspatriae, state juvenile courts and federal
judges emphasized supervision and treatment rather than
punishment 2 The juvenile court system, unlike the criminal courts,
was considered individualistic. Judges, concerned with the child's
social welfare, were assisted by social workers who investigated the
child's background and made recommendations for individual
rehabilitative treatment plans.33 This informal and flexible procedure
was thought to create less trauma for the juvenile and aid in a
cooperative approach to rehabilitation.4 Juvenile proceedings and
records remained private to protect children from the stigma of public
criminal trials,3 and juvenile records were expunged upon reaching
when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the
principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such
as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." Black's Law
Dictionary 1114 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of the origins of the parens patriae
doctrine and its application to the juvenile justice system, see generally Douglas R.
Rendleman, ParensPatriae From Chanceryto the Juvenile Court,23 S.C. L Rev. 205
(1971).
25. See Siegel & Senna, supra note 24, at 310; Johnson, supra note 21, at 718.
26. See Klempner & Parker, supra note 11, at 25.
27. See Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report, 86
(1999) [hereinafter 1999 Report].
28. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, Pub. L No. 75-666, § 2, 52 Stat. 764,
765 (1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994)); Knut S. Johnson,
Juvenile Cases in FederalCourt, in Defending a Federal Criminal Case § 18.00 (1995).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031.
30. See William S. Sessions & Faye M. Bracey, A Synopsis of the FederalJuvenile
DelinquencyAct, 14 St. Mary's L.J. 509,510 (1983).
31. See id. at 518-19; infra Part II.A for a discussion of federal juvenile waiver
practices.
32. See Feld, Punishment,supra note 22, at 824.
33. See id at 825.
34. See id
35. See Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal
Interventionin JuvenileJustice,51 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L 331,335 (1997).
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the age of majority.3 6

Adhering to the notion of parens patriae, and the premise of the
juvenile system as a civil rather than criminal arena, juvenile court
judges were granted broad flexibility in addressing delinquent
behavior.37 Consequently, juvenile courts rarely utilized the formal
procedures of the criminal courtroom.38 Euphemistic terminology and
separate courts served to distinguish juvenile proceedings from
criminal prosecutions. 39 Government counsel thus filed a petition
rather than charges, children were considered respondents rather than
defendants, were "adjudicated delinquent" instead of "found guilty,"
and were committed rather than sentenced." As a result, delinquents
were often deprived of typical due process protections afforded to
adult defendants.41
Critics of the juvenile court system had historically argued that
juvenile proceedings were unconstitutional." Although prior to the
1960s the prevailing theory was that constitutional notions of due
process were inapplicable in juvenile courts,43 adjudicating juveniles
often resulted in outcomes resembling criminal sentences, and
juveniles repeatedly claimed that the non-adversarial nature of the45
system violated their constitutional rights." In Kent v. United States,
the Supreme Court held for the first time that juveniles are entitled to
due process and to representation by counsel.46
Sixteen-year-old Morris Kent confessed to committing rape and
robbery.47 Kent's attorney, anticipating a prosecutorial waiver
petition," filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of
jurisdiction. 49 The juvenile court judge, without ruling on the motion,
entered a judgment waiving jurisdiction based on a "full
investigation."5 The judge did not describe the investigation nor did
he provide a rationale for his decision to waive Kent to adult status."
36. See id.
37. See Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of
the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 371,
376-77 (1998).
38. See id.
39. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 476-77.
40. See Klein, supra note 37, at 376-77.
41. See Siegel & Senna, supra note 24, at 315.
42. See id.
43. See Sessions & Bracey, supra note 30, at 511.
44. See Yeckel, supra note 35, at 341.
45. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
46. See id. at 554.
47. See id. at 544.
48. A prosecutorial waiver petition is a motion made by the prosecutor to transfer
the juvenile defendant to adult status.
49. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 545; see infra Part II.A for a discussion of juvenile
transfer proceedings.
50. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
51. See id.
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The Court held that a judge's exercise of power via parens patriae is
not unlimited.52 In its discussion, the Court recognized significant
problems with the Juvenile Court Act 5 3 including the substantial
degree of discretion given to juvenile court judges."s Writing for the
Court, Justice Fortas stated that "the admonition to function in a
'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness.""5 The Court raised a constitutional challenge to the
doctrine of parens patriae by acknowledging that theoretically the
juvenile court provided less due process but a higher degree of
concern for the individual juvenile than courts provide for adult
defendants.56 In reality, however, the Court noted that juveniles may
receive the "worst of both worlds ... neither the protections accorded

to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children." T Kent concluded that prior to transferring a juvenile to
adult status, the juvenile must be afforded a formal hearing at which
he is entitled to representation by counsel, and that the juvenile's
attorney must be given access to all records considered by the court in
reaching its decision. 8
In 1967, the Court's decision in In re Gault 9 reaffirmed the
application of due process requirements to juvenile proceedings.
Gerald Gault was on probation for a minor property offense when he
was arrested for making crank phone calls.' As punishment for the
calls, he was committed to a training school for the duration of his
minority. 61 Gault's attorney filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging numerous due process violations, including failure to provide
the juvenile's family with notice of the charges, failure to provide the
defendant with an opportunity to retain counsel, and failure to
provide the juvenile with the right against self-incrimination and an
opportunity for appellate review.62 The Court held that in juvenile
proceedings, "[n]otice, to comply with due process requirements, must
be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that
reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must 'set
forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.'' The Court further
held that because a juvenile proceeding has the potential to result in
loss of liberty and is comparable to an adult felony proceeding, the
52
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
6263.

See id. at 554-56.
See 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994)).
See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
Id at 555.
See id. at 554; 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 90.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
See id at 561-62.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
See id. at 4.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 10.
Id. at 33 (citing National Crime Comm'n Report 87).
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juvenile should benefit from the expertise of counsel.' 4 The Court
also ruled that juveniles have the right to exercise the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,' and that a juvenile
has a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 66 The Court in
effect rejected the doctrine of parenspatriae,describing the concept as
"murky and of dubious historical relevance."'67
Gault extended many significant due process protections to
juveniles. In writing for the Court, Justice Fortas stated:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure.... The absence of
substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive
careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of
procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always
produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from
established principles of due process have frequently
resulted not in
68
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.
The Gault decision shifted judicial attention toward determining guilt
or innocence, thereby focusing juvenile courts on punishmentoriented remedies.6 9 The Court's recognition of a juvenile's right
against self-incrimination increased the similarity between juvenile
and adult criminal proceedings.70
In In re Winship,71 the Court further pushed juvenile court
proceedings in a punishment-oriented direction when it mandated
that delinquency be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." Samuel
Winship had stolen $112 from a woman's purse and was adjudicated
delinquent by a New York State court.7" At the time of the trial, New
York juvenile courts operated under a preponderance of the evidence
standard.73 Winship's counsel argued that Winship was entitled to
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that use of the
preponderance standard was constitutional error.74 The Supreme
Court concluded that "reasonable doubt" is the appropriate standard
for delinquency proceedings.75 In applying such a strict standard, the
64. See id. at 36. To this end, the Court noted that "[t]he juvenile needs the
assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a
defense and to prepare and submit it." Id.
65. See id. at 55.
66. See id. at 56-57.
67. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 90.
68. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19.
69. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 478.
70. See id. at 479; supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
71. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
72. See id. at 359-60.
73. See id. at 360.
74. See id. at 359.
75. See id. at 368.
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Court elevated due process requirements in juvenile proceedings to
the status of adult criminal trials76 and effectively minimized the

importance of a distinct system of rehabilitation for juveniles.
Finally, in Breed v. JonesI the Court ruled that it is
unconstitutional to subject a child to a criminal trial after that child is
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court. Gary Jones was adjudicated
delinquent for armed robbery at the age of seventeen. 78 At his
dispositional hearing, the judge waived jurisdiction to criminal court. 9
Jones then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that he
had "already been placed once in jeopardy and convicted of the
offense charged" and that the further transfer proceedings violated
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.P
The Supreme Court held that trying a juvenile in both juvenile and
criminal court did in fact violate the double jeopardy clause81
These Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s and 1970s transformed
the structure and processes of the juvenile justice system.
Implementing due process guarantees diminished the rehabilitative
nature of the juvenile system, replacing it wvith a more traditional
adversarial model designed to protect the constitutional rights of
minor defendants. The implementation of due process marked the
failure of the parens patriae scheme to adequately serve the best
interests of juvenile offenders.82
In addition to the Supreme Court, contemporary commentators,
reacting to a growing juvenile crime rate, also acknowledged the
failure of the rehabilitative system.' Programs were analyzed and
findings were grim. The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, for
example, conducted between 1936 and 1945, utilized interviews,
psychiatric evaluations, and psychological tests to identify 750 boys
likely to become delinquent.8 Three hundred and twenty five of the
boys were placed in a group that received individual counseling and
family guidance, tutoring, recreational activities, medical treatment,
and even financial assistance. s The other 325 were placed in a group

76. See Yeckel, supra note 35, at 341-42.

77. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
7& See id. at 521-22.
79. See id at 523-24.
80. Id. at 525-26. The double jeopardy clause states that no person shall "be

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const.
Amend. V.

81. See Breed, 421 U.S. at 541.
82. For a discussion of the breakdown of parenspatriae,see supra notes 41-79 and

accompanying text.
83. See LaMar T. Empey, American Delinquency: Its Meaning and Construction
374-75 (1982).
84. See id. at 380.
85. See id
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where no such support was rendered.86 Thirty years after the
implementation of the program, the boys who received services had,
on average, higher crime rates and less occupational success than
those who were left alone.' The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study
was one of many rehabilitative treatment programs that proved to be
ineffective in controlling juvenile crime.18
The failure of the rehabilitative system to effectively reduce the
juvenile crime problem in America led lawmakers to turn in a more
punitive direction.
Retributive philosophers argued that the
rehabilitation system was too lenient and had broken down juvenile
respect for authority. 9 They urged legislatures to adopt a more
disciplinary approach to juvenile justice, 9° advocating reforms such as:
(1) lowering the age of accountability for crime; (2) punishing and
incapacitating offenders; and (3) abolishing the juvenile court.91
These calls for reform in the 1960s and 1970s, together with the
Supreme Court's due process holdings, increased juvenile crime rates,
and the demonstrated failures of the rehabilitative approach led state
legislatures to enact increasingly tougher procedural laws. For
example, by the end of 1997, forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia had modified or removed traditional juvenile
confidentiality provisions.' By 1995, twenty-one states had amended
legislation to allow prosecutors, law enforcement and social agencies,
schools, victims, or the public access to a juvenile's records.
Additional legislative reforms, including permitting the fingerprinting
of juveniles, releasing a juvenile's identity, and in certain instances
conducting open hearings, further reflect the punitive trend in the
justice system. 93

Statutory purpose clauses also indicate the shift from a
rehabilitative to a punitive system of justice for juveniles. The
purpose of the first juvenile court in Illinois reflected the initial
rehabilitative mandate:
[T]o secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance,
preferably in his own home, as will serve the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of
86. See id.
87. See id.; see also Klempner and Parker, supra note 11, at 261 ("[A]s early as
1940, in the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, the clinical case-work approach to
delinquency was shown to be unworkable."). But see Richard J. Lundman, Prevention
and Control of Juvenile Delinquency 42 (1984) ("The Cambridge-Somerville Youth
Study was clearly compromised by teachers who refused to single out juveniles
headed for trouble with the law and by World War II.").
88. See Empey, supra note 83, at 380.
89. See id. at 383.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 101.
93. See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders
and Victims: 1997 Update on Violence 29 (1997) [hereinafter, 1997 Update].
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the community; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties
whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents
only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public
cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the
minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody,
care, and discipline as nearly as ossible equivalent to that which
should be given by his parents ....
The Illinois statute emphasized protection of the individual child. It
stressed concern for the juvenile over concern for the safety of society,
reflecting the progressive notion that delinquency was caused by
external environmental factors for which the juvenile was not
primarily responsible. This purpose clause was used by many states in
their early juvenile justice legislation. 95
Over the past decade, more than ten state legislatures have
amended the purpose clauses in their juvenile justice statutes." These
revisions have shifted the purpose of juvenile courts from
rehabilitation and juvenile protection to public safety and individual
accountability. 7 The current Florida statute, for example, states that
"[I]t is the policy of the state wvith respect to juvenile justice and
delinquency prevention to first protect the public from acts of
delinquency." 98 Florida recognizes the public's need for protection
and places the needs of society above those of the individual
juvenile. 99 Other states have similarly revised juvenile justice purposeclauses to include phrases such as "[h]old juveniles accountable for
criminal behavior," "[p]rovide effective deterrents," "[p]rotect the
public from criminal activity," and "[i]mpose punishment consistent
with the seriousness of the crime."" 0
Notwithstanding the surge in punitive legislation, the distinct
juvenile system and its rehabilitative goals have not completely
disappeared. The Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvaniau' held
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require jury trials in
juvenile court.101 The Court refused to extend due process guarantees
to include trial by jury by determining that the applicable
94. Feld, Punishment,supra note 22, at 841 (citing Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 37, 701-02
(Smith-Hurd 1972)).
95. See id
96. See id at 842.
97. See id
98. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.02(3) (West Supp. 1999).
99. See also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202 (West 1997-98) ("The purpose of this
chapter is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court .... ).
100. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 89. The 1999 Report stated that as of 1997,
Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Rhode
Island emphasize punishment as the philosophical goal behind their juvenile justice
systems. See id. at 87.
101. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
102. See id at 545.
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"fundamental
fairness" standard requires only "accurate
factfinding."' 10 3 The Court's decision prevented the juvenile system
from merging wholesale into a highly structured and procedurally
driven criminal court, thereby maintaining all that is left of the
progressive model. Nonetheless, the overall shift in focus in the
juvenile justice system has spawned debate over the future of juvenile
justice in America, with some arguing for its complete abolition. The
next section explores this debate.
B.

The Debate Between Abolition and Reform

There are two predominant schools of thought that take opposing
positions on the future of the American juvenile justice system. One
school believes that abolishing the juvenile court or implementing
strict punitive reform is the answer to the problem of violent juvenile
crime. The second school argues that a separate system for juveniles
is an integral part of treating delinquency and that it is possible to
incorporate both rehabilitation and punishment into an effective
system of juvenile justice.
1. Abolish the Juvenile Court
Proponents of punitive juvenile justice argue that rehabilitation
programs have overwhelmingly failed, and point to rapidly increasing
juvenile crime rates for support."° They maintain that there is no
proof that rehabilitation programs or the juvenile court system have
ever been effective. 1°5 Abolitionists argue that an independent
juvenile court is no longer necessary because it amounts to no more
than a criminal court with lesser procedural protections.'06 They thus
perceive the criminal system as a more effective institution for
handling juvenile offenders. 1°7
Professor Feld has suggested, and others agree, that punishment
and rehabilitation cannot coexist.108
A punishment-oriented
philosophy views the offender as morally responsible for his or her
actions, and holds that the offender deserves sanctions appropriate to
103. See id. at 543.
104. See Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation,
Punishment, or Prevention, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Fall 1995, at 135, 139
("Rehabilitation has not been shown to have any predictably beneficial effect.");
Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 397

(1996)

("[R]eformers who advocate the abolition of a separate system for

juveniles... regard the promise of the juvenile court to rehabilitate as an empty one,
never fulfilled in the past and unattainable in the future ...
105. See Melli, supra note 104, at 397.
106. See Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and HabitualJuvenile Offender Statutes:
Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48
Vand. L. Rev. 479, 492 (1995).
107. See Melli, supra note 104, at 397.
108. See Feld, Punishment,supra note 22, at 833.
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his or her past offenses."' A rehabilitative philosophy, on the other
hand, views external circumstances as the cause of delinquent
behavior, thus focusing on the possible treatment methods available
to change the child's future behavior. 10 Because of the fundamental
incongruity between these approaches, Professor Feld believes that
the juvenile court should be collapsed into the criminal system."' This
philosophy supports Justice Fortas's concern that juveniles receive the
minimal procedural
worst of both worlds in juvenile court:
2
and
ineffective
treatment
programs."
protections
Professor Feld maintains that the juvenile court system was doomed
from the start because it combines social welfare with penal social
control functions.11 3 He argues that social welfare is a societal
responsibility and not a judicial one."' Courts have no control over
the resources they need to effectively manage juvenile delinquency,
and in practice, crime control considerations come before a juvenile's
individual welfare." 5 Professor Feld has proposed that states
"uncouple social welfare from social control" and allow the criminal
6
court to try juvenile offenders.1
In In re Gault,"7 Justice Stewart also expressed the view that
punishment and rehabilitation are mutually exclusive goals."' "[A]
juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite
of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The
object of the one is correction of a condition. The object of the other
109. See id.
110. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 493.
111. See id. at 493-94.
112. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); supra notes 46-58 and
accompanying text. Professor Feld has implied, however, that the common law
infancy defense would serve as a protective vehicle for juveniles prosecuted in
criminal court. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformationof the Juvenile Court,75 Minn.
L. Rev. 691, 724 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]. The common law infancy
defense states that children between the ages of seven and fourteen are presumably
incapable of committing criminal offenses. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 503, 505 (1984). Professor
Walkover points to the Washington criminal code to illustrate the age variations
associated with the defense. The Washington Code codifies the infancy defense but
reduces the maximum applicable age limit to twelve. See id. at 505 n.8. The code
states that "[c]hildren under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime.
Children of eight and under tvelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of
committing crime, but this presumption may be removed by proof that they have
sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect, and to know that it wvas wrong."
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.04.050 (1975).
113. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-PartI1: Race and
the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 327, 381 (1999) [hereinafter
Feld, Race].
114. See id
115. See id
116. d at 383.
117. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
118. See id. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying
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is conviction and punishment for a criminal act.""' 9 Justice Stewart
did not consider the possibility of combining rehabilitative and
punitive principles to reform the juvenile justice system.
2.

Maintain a Separate System for Juvenile Justice

Proponents for retaining the juvenile justice system argue that the
system should incorporate a balance between the modern punitive
trend and the traditional rehabilitative approach to confronting
delinquent behavior.'
Under this approach, the juvenile court
remains an important institution even with the shift in emphasis.
These theorists argue that punitive reforms have not been effective in
reducing juvenile crime rates or controlling the delinquency problem
121
in America.
Even though judicial decisions and legislative amendments often
formally reject retribution as the primary goal of the juvenile justice
system, recent reforms stress a "get tough" punitive approach to
juvenile crime. 122 Proponents of a "just desserts" standard believe in
the punishment of juveniles according to past behavior and the nature
of the alleged offense.' 13 Critics argue that such an approach fails to
consider the individual and his likelihood for successful rehabilitation.
Juvenile offenders in similar situations are sanctioned equally on the
basis of "objective and legally relevant characteristics such as
seriousness of offense, culpability, or criminal history.' 12 4 "Get
tough" legislation does not address the juvenile's individual
circumstances, the consequences of placing youths in adult
correctional facilities, or the quality and effectiveness of the programs
available to them. 125
Contrary to current belief, the rehabilitation model was not
completely unsuccessful. The lack of statistical evidence of success
indicates that reformers were so committed to protecting juveniles
from the harsh conditions of the criminal court that they failed to
thoroughly research which rehabilitation programs showed promise
and which were destined to fail. When the system proved ineffective,
legislatures opted to abandon it. There were, however, several
promising programs that showed varying rates of success. The
Sacramento County Diversion Project, for example, had moderate
119. 387 U.S. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
120. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 506-10.

121. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 16, at 361-63.
122. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 481. For an explanation of the "get tough"
punitive approach, see Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L. Comito, Note, Rethinking the
Tough Sentencing of Teenage Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67 Fordham

L. Rev. 3109,3120-23 (1999).
123. See Feld, Punishment,supra note 22, at 836.

124. Id.
125. See Feld, Legislative Changes,supra note 13, at 519.
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success rates. The project was created in 1970 to determine whether
short-term family crisis therapy would prevent delinquency."z Special
training of deputy probation officers using crisis-intervention skills
replaced overnight detention and referral to juvenile court.' -' Only
13.9% of the juveniles subject to diversion intake were detained
overnight compared to 55.5% of the juveniles processed through
regular intake.1" Additionally, only 3.7% of the program's targets
ended up in juvenile court, compared to 19.8% of the regular
probation intake.129 Though the program was only moderately
successful, it did slightly reduce recidivism rates." Thorough research
and scrutiny of additional prevention and intervention programs will
aid the juvenile system in formulating effective treatment plans.
Several states have successfully implemented serious and habitual
juvenile offender statutes (SHJOs). These statutes create multiagency programs that combine an initial detention period with
intensive supervision and services designed to rehabilitate and
reintegrate the juvenile back into society.13 1 The success of a few
initial SHIJOs indicates that the goal of a mixed punitive and
rehabilitative treatment plan is not an impossible one to achieve., In addition, Professor Rosenberg of the University of Houston Law
Center, a staunch supporter of preserving the juvenile justice system,
argues that abolitionists such as Professor Feld overstate the disparity
of procedural protections between the juvenile and adult justice
systems.'s Professor Rosenberg argues that abolitionists idealize the
degree to which procedural due process functions in adult criminal
court."M
She concludes that maintaining a juvenile system is
imperative because adult courts will not adequately consider youth
and immaturity in determining guilt.13
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
points

See Lundman, supra note 87, at 84-86.
See id. at 86.
See id. at 89.
See id.
See id. at 90. Follow-up programs, however, were unsuccessful. Lundman
out an evaluation flaw in the study: "Most of the experimental subjects

involved in the Sacramento County Diversion Project were exposed to a multiple-

treatment package consisting of three distinct elements: (1) no overnight detention;
(2) no referral to juvenile court; and (3) crisis intervention and family crisis
counseling." Id. at 95. Lundman indicates that the multi-treatment package makes it
impossible to determine whether the modest success rate was the result of the lack of
overnight detention, less contact with the juvenile court,

short-term crisis

intervention, or any combination of these factors. Consequently, he points out that
while follow-up programs failed, there is good reason to probe deeper into the

preventive philosophies. See id at 95-96.
131. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 510.
132 See id.
133. See Irene Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile
Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 163, 165-66 (1993).
134. See id. at 173.
135. See id. at 175-85.
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Finally, psychological research indicates that juveniles move
through developmental stages of cognitive functioning with respect to
legal reasoning, internalization of societal expectations, and ethical
decision-making. 3 6 By the time a juvenile reaches the age of fourteen,
he has acquired most of the moral values and reasoning capacity that
will guide his adult behavior. 37 If a fourteen-year-old knows right
from wrong, then he may possess the requisite mens rea to be
convicted of a criminal offense. 3 But a psychological analysis must
not stop there. Developmental psychologists have found that, where a
juvenile has an awareness of right and wrong, he may still be less
capable than an adult of making moral distinctions or sound
judgments. 39 Juveniles have less of a capacity to appreciate the
consequences of their actions than do adults.140 Juveniles, especially
during their adolescent years, are more impulsive, more vulnerable,
and less self-disciplined than most adults. 4 ' Juveniles also have a
lesser capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range
terms than do adults. 42 Crimes committed by children may be just as
harmful to victims as those committed
by adults, but they arguably
43
deserve different consequences.1

Notwithstanding the current movement toward a more punitive
system of juvenile justice, juvenile court caseloads are increasing and
juvenile crime is becoming more violent. 44 Because the strictly
136. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 523-24. (citing J. Piaget, The
Moral Judgment of the Child (1932); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive
Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization Theory and
Research 347 (D. Goslin ed., 1969); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and
Legal Justice, in Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine
eds., 1977); Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategiesfor an Ethical Legality, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1974)).
137. See id. at 523-24. (citing Kohlberg, The Development of Children's
Orientations Toward a Moral Order,6 Vita Humana 11, 16 (1963)).
138. See id. at 524 (citing J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 212-22 (2d ed.
1960)).
139. See id. at 525.
140. See id.
141. See id. (citing Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy
Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 56 (1978)).
142. See id.(citing Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy
Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 56 (1978)). Professor Feld
notes:
[T]he crimes of juveniles are seldom their fault alone; society shares at least
some of the blame for their offenses as a result of juveniles' limited
opportunities to learn to make correct choices. Indeed, even though the
ability to make responsible choices is learned behavior, the dependent status
of juveniles systematically deprives them of opportunities to learn to be
responsible. Finally, even if a youth is aware of the abstract criminal
prohibition, juveniles are more susceptible to peer group influences and
group process dynamics than are their older counterparts.
Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
143. See id. at 525.
144. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 144. "Juvenile court caseloads increased
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rehabilitative approach to delinquency was unsuccessful, and the
strictly punitive approach is also failing, the answer may lie in striking
a balance between these competing theories in order to optimize
deterrence and rehabilitation. 4 5 Proponents of maintaining a distinct
system of juvenile justice thus urge legislatures to incorporate
successful rehabilitation programs in addition to adding punitive
sanctions. 146

The practical application of these warring theories is reflected in
juvenile transfer proceedings. The next part discusses the role of
waiver provisions throughout the history of the juvenile court and
outlines the structure and processes of juvenile cases in the federal
juvenile justice system. It then presents federal courts' competing
interpretations of "prior delinquency records" in determining whether
to transfer juveniles to adult status in the interest of justice.
II. JUDICIAL WAIVER: INCONSISTENT FEDERAL
APPROACHES TO DETERMINING JURISDICTION
This part defines the waiver provisions that allow judges to transfer
juveniles to adult status. It then analyzes the federal transfer
provision, contained in 18 U.S.C. § 5032, and explains the process by
which a juvenile becomes subject to criminal prosecution in federal
court. This part then discusses the differing definitions that federal
district court judges apply when considering a juvenile's prior
delinquency record in the context of juvenile waiver hearings.
A. The Transferof Juveniles to Adult Status and the Impact of
PunitiveReform
Since its inception, the juvenile justice system has provided for
"waiver" of juveniles to adult criminal jurisdiction. Transferring
young offenders charged with serious crimes to criminal courts served
initially as a "safety valve" that helped insulate juvenile court systems
from public and political criticisms that they "coddled" juveniles
'
charged with highly visible or violent crimes. 47
Ten states had
transfer provisions in place prior to the 1920s.' By 1940, another ten
states had added such provisions. Today, every juvenile justice system

49% between 1987 and 1996. The juvenile population increased only 11% in that
time." Id. Additionally, there was a 100% increase in person offenses within the same
time span. See id.
145. See Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There
Still a Place for Rehabilitation?,25 Conn. L. Rev. 57, 59-60 (1992); Rosenberg, supra
note 133, at 165-66.
146. See Rosenberg, supra note 134, at 165-66.
147. Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and
Practice: Persistence,Seriousness and Race, 14 Law & Ineq. J. 73, 82-83 (1995).
148. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 29.
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includes a transfer provision of some kind. 49
Transferring a juvenile to adult status is a sentencing decision that
represents a choice between the punitive disposition of criminal court
and the rehabilitative disposition of juvenile court 50 Juvenile courts
traditionally assigned fundamental importance to individualized
treatment, while criminal systems accord greater significance to the
seriousness of the alleged offense and proportional punishment' 5
Studies have shown that the consequences of transfer may be drastic.
As of 1995, forty-two jurisdictions required or permitted juveniles
waived to adult status to be transferred from juvenile detention
facilities to adult jails pending trial. 5 ' In some of these states,
juveniles are not separated from the adult criminal population even
though they have yet to be convicted of any offense. 5 3 In addition,
juveniles transferred to adult status often receive harsher sentences
than do adults in the same jurisdiction. In 1994, the average prison
sentence of juveniles waived to adult status and convicted of a felony
was nine-and-a-half years.1 54 The average sentence for adults
convicted of the same crimes was five-and-three-quarter years. 155
Statistics reveal that juveniles transferred to adult court and housed
in adult prisons are five times more likely to become victims of sexual
assault and at least 50% more likely to be attacked with a weapon
than those juveniles housed in rehabilitation facilities. 156 Additionally,
counseling programs and efforts to improve family relations are rated
much lower in adult facilities than in juvenile detention centers.'57 A
1987 study revealed that upon release, juveniles incarcerated in adult
facilities had higher rates of re-arrest, committed more serious rearrest offenses, and were re-arrested more promptly than those
housed in juvenile facilities. 5 '
Juvenile institutions, on the other hand, make rehabilitation their
primary purpose. 59 Though public institutions vary from state to
state, they are generally located in rural areas and have a campus-style
layout." Housing is generally broken down into cottage units that
create small groups for professionals to work with. 161 Nearly all
delinquency institutions include group or individual counseling,
149. See id.
150. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 487.
151. See id. at 487-88.
152. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Rush to Waive Children to Adult Court, 10
Criminal Justice 39, 41 (1995).
153. See id.
154. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 178.
155. See id.
156. See Shepherd, supra note 152, at 42.
157. See id.
158. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 182.
159. See Siegal & Senna, supra note 24, at 450.
160. See id. at 448.
161. See id.
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educational and vocational training, recreational programs, and

religious counseling.1 62 Thus, placement in an adult rather than a
juvenile facility can have a profound impact on an inmate's
intellectual
and psychological development, and even on his personal
163
safety.

The most common form of juvenile transfer is judicial waiver, a
practice employed in almost every jurisdiction." Most state waiver
statutes authorize discretionary transfer based on a juvenile court

judge's assessment of a youth's "amenability to treatment" or
"dangerousness."165 Most commonly, a prosecutor makes the decision
to move for a waiver hearing.166 As guaranteed by Kent v. United
States,67 the juvenile has a right to a formal hearing to determine

whether he or she is a candidate for adult jurisdiction. Judges are
typically instructed to consider the offender's age, the seriousness of
the offense charged, any prior delinquency record, clinical
evaluations, and treatment prognoses.'6
After weighing and
balancing all of these factors, juvenile court judges determine whether
the individual juvenile has the potential to be rehabilitated. If it is
162. See id at 450.
163. There are a small number of states, however, that continue to incarcerate
juveniles in isolated sections of adult prisons. See id. at 448. Other types of juvenile
sentences include probation, restitution, group homes, and foster care. See id. at 41834.
164. See Brenda Gordon, Note, A Criminal'sJustice or a Child's Injustice? Trends
in the Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdictionand the Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41
Ariz. L. Rev. 193, 204-05 (1999). There are three methods that states use to transfer
juveniles to adult status: (1) judicial waiver; (2) prosecutorial waiver or concurrent
jurisdiction; and (3) statutory or legislative exclusion. See 1999 Report, supra note 27,
at 102. Judicial waiver gives the judge discretionary authority to determine the
juvenile's amenability to treatment. See id. at 103. Prosecutorial waiver permits the
prosecutor to file the case in either criminal or juvenile court. See id. at 102. The
practice of statutory exclusion excludes certain juvenile offenders from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See id.
165. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 147, at 83.
166. See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Texas, 983 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(stating that the government moved to transfer the juvenile defendant to adult status);
State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 816 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1994)
(same); In re Ralph M., 559 A.2d 179, 183 (Conn. 1989) (same); In re E.H., 276 S.E2d
557,561 (W. Va. 1981) (same).
167. 383 U.S. 541 (1966); see also supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
168. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 147, at 83. The District of Columbia
statute, for example, provides that a judge should consider.
(1) the child's age; (2) the nature of the present offense and the extent and
nature of the child's prior delinquency record; (3) the child's mental
condition; (4) the child's response to past treatment efforts including
whether the child has absconded from the legal custody of the Mayor or a
juvenile institution; (5) the techniques, facilities, and personnel for
rehabilitation available to the Division and to the court that would have
jurisdiction after transfer; and (6) [t]he potential rehabilitative effect on the
child of providing parenting classes or family counseling for one or more
member's of the child's family or for the child's caregiver or guardian.
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(e) (1981).
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determined that the juvenile is a threat to public safety and that state
rehabilitation programs will likely be ineffective, the judge will often
waive the juvenile to adult status. The decision is thus a fact-specific
determination subject to the education and expertise of the presiding
judge.
Over the past decade, the use of judicial waiver provisions has
changed, signaling America's movement toward a more punitive
system for juveniles. 169 Between 1985 and 1994, for example, the
number of cases judicially waived increased by 71%,170 and the
proportion of younger juveniles transferred to criminal court
jurisdiction also increased dramatically.17" ' Between 1992 and 1995,
forty-one states passed laws making it easier to transfer juveniles to
adult status. This is likely the result of laws that lower the minimum
age for transfer or exclude older juveniles charged with specified
crimes from juvenile jurisdiction altogether. 173 Some states have
relaxed the government's burden of proof in transfer hearings,
thereby making transfer more probable.1 74 Additional trends in recent
amendments include expanding the list of crimes eligible for waiver
and prior-record provisions that make repeat offenders eligible for
waiver under certain circumstances. 175 A number of states provide
that once a juvenile is waived to adult status, he or she will thereafter
be tried as an adult for any subsequent offenses. 176 Furthermore, nine
states have enacted "presumptive waiver" provisions that require the
juvenile to prove his or177her eligibility for rehabilitation in order to
remain in juvenile court.
The federal transfer provision, governed by 18 U.S.C. § 5032,178
functions similarly to the state waiver laws. Because federal juvenile
proceedings are less common than state proceedings, there is minimal79
binding authority on interpreting the federal transfer provision.
The federal justice system has no distinct juvenile court, no judges
exclusively educated in the problems associated with juvenile
delinquency, and no specialized probation officers.'
In determining
169. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 170.
170. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 31.

During the same time period,

delinquency cases increased 41%. See id.
171. See id.

172. See id. at 30.
173. See id.

174. See Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3
Psychol., Pub. Pol'y & L. 3,5 (1997).
175. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 30.
176. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 103.
177. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 30; see also supra note 164 for a discussion
of the three forms of waiver provisions.
178. See 18 U.S.C § 5032 (1994).
179. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (C.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub
nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
180. See Johnson, supra note 28, § 18.01. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of
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whether waiver is suitable, district court judges are expected to
determine the best interests of a juvenile defendant using only the
guidelines provided by statute.
In 1974, Congress amended federal juvenile legislation to include
many of the Supreme Court-mandated due process guarantees.""'
Thus, when a district court judge tries a juvenile offender as a
juvenile, protections such as the right to counsel are afforded. The
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA)I 2
amended the FJDA183 by requiring judicial approval before
prosecuting a juvenile as an adult, restricting the number of offenses
for which a juvenile can be tried as an adult, and stripping federal
courts of unlimited criminal juvenile jurisdiction.' This amendment
created a more structured federal juvenile justice system and
attempted to limit the number of cases transferred to adult status.
The Congressional Declaration of Purpose and Policy, contained in 42
U.S.C. § 5602, states that the purpose of the JJDPA is to aid state and
local governments in improving the administration of their juvenile
justice systems."8 The JJDPA "reflects a legislative perception that
accused juvenile offenders generally belong in the hands of state
which offer specialized courts, judges, and
authorities,"'"
rehabilitation facilities to meet the special needs of a convicted child.
The general philosophy behind the federal juvenile justice system
District courts exercising
reflects individualized treatment. 18
jurisdiction over a juvenile must strike a balance between providing
Prisons has no distinct juvenile facilities. See United States v. Dion L, 19 F. Supp. 2d
1224, 1227 (D.N.M. 1998). The federal government is forced to contract with state
and private juvenile facilities that provide counseling and rehabilitation services. See
id. Unfortunately, "juveniles are often assigned depending on where space is then
available" and there is no guarantee that they will be incarcerated conveniently for
family members. Id.
181. See supra notes 46-81 and accompanying text.
182. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976)).
183. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994); Yeckel, supra note 35, at 339. The purpose of the
JJDPA is to prevent juvenile offenders from suffering the stigma of adult criminal
prosecution and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation. See United States v. Doe,
94 F.3d 532,536 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218,220 (10th Cir.
1990). Congress later amended the JJDPA when it passed the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 764 (1984) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Responding to the growing number
of violent crimes committed by juveniles, the Act increased the number of offenses
for which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. See id. Additionally, the Act imposes
mandatory adult status under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994).
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 5602 (1994).
186. United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253,1258 (6th Cir. 1991).
187. See, eg., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (-The
purpose of the federal juvenile delinquency proceeding is to... encourage treatment
and rehabilitation."); United States v. Dion L., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (D.N.M.
1998) ("The purpose of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is to remove juveniles
from the ordinary criminal process and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation."
(citations omitted)).
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rehabilitation for juvenile offenders and protecting society from
dangerous individuals. 188 While sanctions exist for "anti-social acts,"' 89
a juvenile with rehabilitative potential (as determined by the district
court judge) within the period of minority should generally remain in
the juvenile system. 190 If there is no realistic chance of rehabilitation,
the balance tips in favor of prosecution as an adult criminal.' 9'
The JJDPA limited federal jurisdiction over a juvenile'9g and
delineated three possibilities under which a juvenile may be tried as
an adult in federal court: (1) the juvenile consents; 193 (2) the juvenile
falls under the umbrella of a mandatory transfer provision; 194 or (3)
the Attorney General requests criminal jurisdiction in "the interest of
justice" where the juvenile is charged with a violent felony or specified
drug offense." Transfer "in the interest of justice" is permissible only
where the juvenile allegedly committed a crime of violence or an
enumerated narcotics offense.'9 6 It is the "interest of justice" transfer
188. See United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Alexander, 695 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp.
1398, 1401 (C.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th
Cir. 1998).
189. See TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1401; United States v. E.K., 471 F. Supp. 924, 932
(D. Or. 1979).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
purpose of the juvenile justice system is to encourage the treatment and rehabilitation
of juvenile defendants); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990)
(same).
191. See Doe, 871 F.2d at 1253; Alexander, 695 F.2d at 401.
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994). The statute provides for three situations in which
a prosecutor may invoke federal jurisdiction over a juvenile: (1) a state lacks or
refuses to assert jurisdiction over the juvenile offender; (2) state programs do not
meet the needs of the juvenile; or (3) certain specified offenses are charged and there
is a substantial federal interest in the case. See id.
193. See id. A juvenile might request transfer because he believes that he will
receive a lighter sentence under adult criminal standards. This is especially true in a
case where the juvenile believes he will benefit from a jury trial, as there is no
constitutional right to trial by jury in juvenile court. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528,545-46 (1971).
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Paragraph four of section 5032 mandates transfer when
a juvenile 16 years of age or older commits a violent act that would be considered a
felony if committed by an adult, and the juvenile has previously been convicted of a
delinquent act that would be considered a felony if the juvenile had reached the age
of majority. See id.
195. See id. Paragraph four of section 5032 states that a juvenile 15 years of age or
older who has committed a violent act that would be deemed a felony if committed by
an adult, or committed an act that falls under the umbrella of specified sections of the
Controlled Substances Act, may be proceeded against in a criminal prosecution
initiated by the Attorney General in a motion to transfer the juvenile to adult status
in the interest of justice. See id. The federal system does not dramatically differ from
many of the state systems. Most states, like the federal legislation, have a
combination of transfer provisions. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 102. Fourteen
states have mandatory transfer provisions and 46 have discretionary waiver statutes.
See id. A growing number of states, however, have no minimum age requirement for
waiver. See id. at 104.
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
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prong that is the focus of this Note.
The vagueness of the "interest of justice" transfer provision has
raised interpretative difficulties for the courts and there is sparse
legislative history to guide them."9 To aid courts in defining what is in
"the interest of justice," Congress has delineated six factors for district
court judges to consider when assessing an individual case for transfer:
the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the
alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior

delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development

and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and
the juvenile's response to such efforts; [and] the availability of
programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.'
Section 5032 further instructs judges to consider whether the juvenile
played a leadership role in the criminal activity and whether the
juvenile's offense involved controlled substances or the use of a
firearm. 199 If these factors are present in the given disposition, they
should weigh in favor of transfer to adult status."0
Unfortunately, applying section 5032's balancing test is rarely an
easy task."01 In United States v. TLW,?

for example, the district court

applied each of the six factors in determining that the nature of
TLW's alleged offenses warranted transfer.'
TLW allegedly
distributed crack and cocaine on four separate occasions and on one
of those occasions possessed a gun, indicating that he had the
capacity for violence."0 5 The court's analysis of the age and social
background of the juvenile revealed the instability of TLW's home life
and led the court to determine that the juvenile had rehabilitative
197. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (C.D. II1.1996), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United States v.
Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that section 5032's legislative
history "is scant and capable of differing interpretations"). Attacks on section 5032's
constitutional validity have proven fruitless, see, e.g., United States v. J.D., 525 F.
Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that section 5032 is not unconstitutionally
vague), leaving courts with a federal statutory provision that is far from precise and is
open to varying degrees of interpretation. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; United States v. Doe,
871 F.2d 1248,1252 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 18 (1st Cir.
1984); United States v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1982); TLW, 925 F.
Supp. at 1400.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (emphasis added).
199. See id
200. See id.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999)
(stating that the decision to transfer a juvenile to adult status is often a difficult one);
TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1404 ("[S]triking the balance between rehabilitation, protection,
and punishment is not easy....").
202. 925 F. Supp. 1398 (C.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub non., United States v. Wilson, 149
F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see also supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the facts of the case.
203. See id at 1403.
204. See id.
205. See id
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potential pending a change of environment. 2 6 In its analysis of TLW's
prior delinquency record, the court considered charges filed against
the juvenile for eighteen prior offenses ranging from aggravated
battery to traffic violations.2 7 TLW, however, had only been
convicted of minor traffic offenses. 2°8 The court found that this factor
weighed both ways because, "[o]n one side, there is a pattern of
violence beginning at a very young age. On the other side, there is the
fact that TLW has never been convicted of a serious offense. '' 2 9 As to
intellectual development and psychological maturity, the court found
that TLW was manipulative, but of a low average intellectual
ability.210 The court concluded that TLW's immaturity would not
preclude rehabilitation."' TLW showed no evidence of any failed
prior attempts at treatment, and therefore this prong weighed in favor
of TLW's treatment as a juvenile.12 Finally, the court found that
23
there were available treatment programs to accommodate TLW.
The court concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that
determining the appropriateness of transfer was a difficult task.
Nonetheless,
TLW was waived to adult status in the interest of
214
justice.

TLW's case illustrates the lack of precision with which section 5032
is applied and the enormous case-by-case discretion practiced in
federal waiver proceedings. Additionally, TLW hints at the potential
unfairness of the federal transfer statute's application to juveniles
capable of rehabilitation. Courts' differing interpretations of a
juvenile's prior delinquency record, one of section 5032's factors, is an
area of special contention and is vulnerable to judicial misapplication
and abuse.
B.

Competing Definitions of a Juvenile's PriorDelinquency Record

While legislative amendments have added crimes for which 25a
juvenile may be waived to adult jurisdiction in the interest of justice,
no objective standard for federal judicial waiver has been delineated.
Though due process guarantees have made the juvenile system less
discretionary, district court judges maintain an enormous amount of
control over which juveniles are tried as adults.216 Judges subjectively
206. See id. at 1402.
207. See id. at 1403.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 1404.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 514 (11th Cir. 1996) ("The
decision whether to transfer a juvenile to trial as an adult under section 5032 is within
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weigh and balance section 5032's factors in order to determine the
most appropriate jurisdiction for juvenile offenders. The lack of
legislative guidance beyond the mere listing of the six factors,
however, can lead to disingenuous reasoning or misinterpretation.
Prior delinquency records, one of the six statutory factors that
district court judges are instructed to consider under section 5032,
have never been clearly defined in the history of the federal juvenile
justice system. Courts have thus been unable to agree on a uniform
definition of a juvenile's prior delinquency record, and have generally
utilized their transfer discretion by defining that record in one of two
ways: some define the record solely by prior adjudicated conduct,
while others define a juvenile's prior delinquency record to include all
prior police contacts.2 17

Consequently, differing definitions of a

juvenile's prior delinquency record may result in different outcomes
for similarly situated offenders.
1. Juvenile's Prior Delinquency Record Consists Solely of
Adjudicated Conduct
Courts holding that a juvenile's prior delinquency record consists
solely of adjudicated conduct consider only prior convictions when
assessing whether transfer would be in the interest of justice.
Advocates for this position, more often defendants than prosecutors,
reason that when prior unadjudicated conduct is admitted, there is a
risk that the trial judge will presume that the juvenile had indeed
committed the offense. They further argue that this risk violates due
process. 2 18 Notwithstanding the presumption of guilt for the alleged
offense for purposes of the transfer hearing, there is no such
presumption applicable to allegations of past conduct.1 9 Proponents
of this position believe that holding juveniles accountable for
unadjudicated conduct violates due process because a juvenile has no
opportunity to present a defense on his behalf, and should be deemed
innocent for failure to be proven guilty.' Absent adjudication on the
merits, there is no way to accurately determine whether the juvenile
committed the prior delinquent act and judges may be biased by its
inclusion. Consequently, a court cannot reliably determine the
appropriateness of transfer based on unadjudicated incidents.

the sound discretion of the trial court provided the court makes findings as to the
criteria outlined in the Act.").

217. See United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249,1253 (10th Cir. 1999).
218. See United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998).
219. See United States v. Leon, 132 F.3d 583, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that

"the court may assume the truth of the government's allegations regarding the
defendant's commission of [the] crime" for purposes of a transfer hearing).
220. See Survey of Recent Cases, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 937, 971 (1999) (stating that
the right to present a defense is fundamental).
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In United States v. Juvenile LWO,2 2 1 the Eighth Circuit confronted

the issue of whether a district court could consider evidence of arrests
that fail to result in convictions when determining a juvenile's transfer
status.222 Juvenile LWO allegedly shot a woman with a rifle that he
stole from her trailer.2' He was charged with assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, first-degree
burglary, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.224 LWO
had previously been arrested for public intoxication. 22 His tribal
record listed additional offenses including profanity, assault, and
resisting lawful arrest.
None of these offenses had been
adjudicated. 22 6 LWO's tribal court record also included convictions
for malicious mischief, intoxication, spousal abuse, resisting arrest,
and driver's license violations. 7 The district court took LWO's prior
unadjudicated conduct into consideration and decided to transfer him
to adult status in the interest of justice.228
The Eighth Circuit remanded the case and held that "it is erroneous
for a district court to consider evidence of incidents or behavior for
which there has been.., no conviction.... Such evidence may be
considered in analyzing the other... factors." 229 The court stated that
"the plain language of the term 'the juvenile's prior delinquency
record' cannot plausibly be interpreted.., to encompass evidence of
conduct which has not been adjudicated or admitted to be delinquent
2 The court reasoned that the provision is unambiguous
or criminal.""
and that district courts exceed their statutory authorization when they
consider crimes charged without a resulting conviction under the
"prior delinquency record" prong."
Similarly, in United States v. Jarrett,2 2 the Seventh Circuit held that
arrests that do not result in convictions are not part of the "juvenile
court records" that the government is required to submit under
section 5032 . 3 In Jarrett, seventeen-year-old Jamie Key was
transferred to adult status in the interest of justice and convicted of

221. 160 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1998).
222. See id. at 1182-83.
223. See id. at 1180-81.
224. See id. at 1181.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 1180.
229. See id. at 1184. The other factors that the court referred to were: (1) "the
juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity," (2) "the age
and social background of the juvenile," and (3) "the nature of past treatment efforts
and the juvenile's response to such efforts." Id. at 1183.
230. Id. at 1183 (emphasis in original).
231. See id.
232. 133 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998).
233. See id. at 537.
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ten counts of possessing heroin with intent to distribute.' - Key had
previously been arrested for criminal trespass to a vehicle, trespass to
state land, battery, aggravated sexual assault, possession of cannabis,
mob action, and heroin possession. 35 None of these arrests resulted in
convictions.3 6 The Seventh Circuit held that a juvenile's prior
delinquency record is comprised solely of adjudicated conduct that
resulted in conviction and therefore the district court was correct in
not considering Key's past arrests when determining the suitability of
transfer.

37

The Seventh Circuit did, however, determine that the

district court's decision to waive Key to adult criminal status was not
an abuse of discretion because the determination was based on the
totality of the circumstances.23
In general criminal law vernacular, "criminal records" refer to prior
offenses that resulted in convictions. The ordinary meaning of
"records" would thus support this camp's viewpoint. Section 5032,
however, refers to "delinquency records," rather than "criminal
records." It therefore remains ambiguous whether delinquency refers
to adjudicated findings of guilt, or extends to records of arrests,
intake, and treatment. By analogizing "delinquency records" to
"criminal records," one could argue that delinquency refers to
"convictions" for delinquent behavior in the juvenile court system.
Because a juvenile's prior delinquency record is a fundamental
element in determining transfer under section 5032, courts holding
that such a record is comprised only of adjudicated conduct argue that
the federal transfer statute would have incorporated a more specific
definition if courts were meant to consider all prior police contacts.3- 9
This view, however, is challenged by those who maintain that the
juvenile system should be and continues to be individualistic and
treatment-oriented. Those taking a broader view of "records" believe
that counsel should be able to paint the most complete picture
possible of the minor defendant so that the district court judge can
make an informed jurisdictional determination.
2. Prior Delinquency Records Consist of all Prior Police Contacts
Advocates for considering all of a juvenile's prior police contacts in
determining the suitability of transfer to adult status maintain that all
juvenile interaction with law enforcement has the potential to educate
a district court judge as to a child's criminal tendencies. -0 All prior
234. See id. at 527.

235. See id at 537.
236. See id
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 1998).
240. See United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1998); United
States v. John Doe #1, No. 98 CR 438, 1999 WL 642828, at *4 n-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
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police contacts include charges, arrests, and convictions documented
by law enforcement officials. Courts taking this position have held
that district court judges, in conducting transfer hearings, should limit
their review to the record itself and not inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the alleged prior offenses. 41 These courts indicate that it
is improper to litigate the merits of a previous arrest in the context of
a transfer hearing.242 Thus, even those espousing a broader reading of
"prior delinquency records" limit their analysis to written police and
court reports.
In United States v. Wilson, 43 for example, the Seventh Circuit
discussed the scope of a juvenile's prior delinquency record when it
reviewed the district court's decision in United States v. TLW.244
Wilson was sixteen-years-old when he was charged with three counts
of distributing cocaine and one count of distributing crack.2 4 The
district court held a transfer hearing in response to the government's
motion to try Wilson as an adult. 46 The district court considered
Wilson's prior delinquency record in determining that Wilson should
be transferred to adult status. 247 Wilson's record, however, was void
of convictions for any serious offenses.248 Wilson had been charged
with, but never convicted of, more than eighteen separate offenses
including aggravated battery.249 Other than being placed under court
supervision for traffic offenses, however, Wilson had never been
subject to court-ordered punishment."
Wilson's counsel argued that the court could not consider arrests
that did not result in convictions."' The Government argued that
Wilson's prior delinquency record consisted of all prior police
contacts, not solely adjudicated conduct.u2 The court concluded that
the juvenile's entire record could be considered so long as review was
limited to the record itself, but gave no support for its reasoning., 3
The government was, therefore, not permitted to present evidence in
1999); United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (C.D. I11.1996), affd sub nor.,
United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
241. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 611-13; John Doe #1, 1999 WL 642828 at *4 n.5.
242. See TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1404.
243. 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
244. 925 F. Supp 1398 (C.D. II1. 1996), affd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149
F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text; see also supra
notes 2-8 and accompanying text for a more complete description of the facts of the
case.
245. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 611.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 611-12.
249. See TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1403.

250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 612; TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1404.
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connection with previous arrestsThe Seventh Circuit later
reviewed and affirmed the district court's transfer order.25
Statutory ambiguity aside, interpreting prior delinquency records to
refer solely to convictions can truncate a transfer inquiry and in many
instances defeat the purpose of careful review. State statutory
definitions of a juvenile's prior delinquency record lend support to the
argument that despite the ambiguous drafting of section 5032, federal
courts should consider all prior bad acts, and that the term
"delinquency record" should not be used interchangeably with
"criminal record."
Arizona legislation, for example, delineates
criteria for juvenile court judges to consider in discretionary transfer
hearings.-56 The statute provides in pertinent part: "the record and
previous history of the child, including previous contacts with juvenile
courts and law enforcement agencies in this and other jurisdictions,
prior periods of probation in any court and their results, and any prior
commitments to juvenile residential placements and secure
institutions."'
The Arizona legislature drafted this provision with
specificity and seemingly intended juvenile court judges to consider
every relevant aspect of the juvenile's prior delinquency record in
determining whether transfer is appropriate.'Those courts that define a juvenile's prior delinquency record to
include all prior police contacts maintain that the more information a
court has on an individual juvenile, the more informed the
jurisdictional decision will be. An individual's case may be greatly
influenced by the court's defining criteria. For example, if a court
chooses to limit its review to adjudicated conduct, there is less chance
that the juvenile will be transferred. The same juvenile in a court that
incorporates prior police contacts into its prior-record review may be
transferred based on findings of violent tendencies or recurring antisocial behavior. The lack of uniformity in the federal approach to
254. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 612.
255. See id at 614.
256. See 17B A.R.S. Juv. Court. Rules of Proc., Rule 14(c) (1970).

257. See id (emphasis added). The Virginia provision instructs judges to consider
"the record and previous history of the juvenile in this or other jurisdictions,
including.., the number and nature of previous contacts with juvenile or circuit
courts...." Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.1 (1999) (emphasis added). Florida's statute

similarly instructs juvenile courts to consider previous "contacts" with governmental
departments and judicial institutions. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.226 (West Supp. 2000)

(emphasis added); see also Az. St. Juv. Ct. Rule 14 ("[Tlhe record and previous
history of the child, including previous contacts with juvenile courts and law
enforcement agencies."). But see, eg., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 1010 (1999) (stating

that the juvenile court is directed to consider "[wihether the child has been convicted
of any prior criminal offense..,

or... [w]hether the child has previously been

subjected to any form of correctional treatment by the Family Court").
258. The Eighth Circuit's argument that Congress's intent was unambiguous in
United States v. Juvenile LWO was unpersuasive.

Comparing 18 U.S.C. § 5032 to

Arizona's juvenile transfer provision signifies that the federal provision is far from
determinative.
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judicial waiver thus results in different dispositional outcomes for
similarly situated offenders. "Sentencing disparities that are not
justified by differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to
offenders and to the public," 9 and therefore may result in violations
of due process. In response to this disparate treatment, the next part
proposes the adoption of a uniform definition of a juvenile's prior
delinquency record that can be applied to all federal juvenile waiver
hearings.
III. PRIOR DELINQUENCY RECORDS AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE
This part proposes a temporary solution to the inconsistent
definitions that federal judges apply to a juvenile's prior delinquency
record in juvenile waiver hearings. It urges federal courts to
incorporate all prior police contacts into their interpretation of "prior
delinquency records" under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, and furthermore to
allow attorneys to present contextual information about those prior
contacts. This part also urges Congress to adopt more effective
juvenile justice legislation by providing courts with detailed transfer
criteria. It then analyzes pending federal legislation pertaining to
juvenile crime and determines why specific proposed reforms are
inadequate to meet the demanding needs of our juvenile justice
system. Finally, it concludes by discussing interim remedies available
to state and federal governments that can improve the efficiency and
fairness of their juvenile justice systems.
A. Adoption of a Uniform Definition That Includes all PriorPolice
Contacts
Section 5032 instructs federal district court judges to consider a
juvenile's prior delinquency record in determining whether a juvenile
should be waived to adult status, but fails to define either "prior
delinquency" or "record." Courts have interpreted this provision in
differing ways: some considering only adjudicated conduct resulting in
conviction and others considering all prior police contacts. The lack
of a uniform standard for determining suitability of waiver results in
the disparate treatment of similarly situated offenders, violating
constitutional notions of due process." In addition, formulating a
more narrow view of prior delinquency records can serve to defeat
Congressional intent to limit transfer to only those juveniles deemed
unlikely to benefit from juvenile rehabilitation programs. The
interpretative problem is starkly apparent in two recent Seventh

259. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3228-29.
260. See id.
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Circuit decisions. In United States v. Jarrett,26 1 the court held that a
juvenile's record consists solely of adjudicated conduct.2 12 In United
States v. Wilson ,263 decided six months later, the same circuit held that
a juvenile's prior delinquency record consists of all prior bad acts.?,
These contradictory findings illustrate the pressing need for a uniform
definition of a juvenile's prior delinquency record.
Courts should adopt a definition of a juvenile's prior delinquency
record that includes all prior police contacts. Courts that currently
apply this definition do not go far enough because they limit their
review of prior police contacts to the record itself in order to prevent
attorneys from litigating the merits of prior alleged offenses in the
context of a waiver hearing.26 In doing so, courts substantially limit
their ability to develop a comprehensive understanding of the juvenile
defendant and therefore decrease the chances of accurately
identifying which juveniles are appropriate candidates for
rehabilitation. Courts should allow attorneys to present information
about prior unadjudicated conduct where necessary. For example, if a
juvenile has a prior arrest for selling drugs, a defense attorney should
be allowed to illustrate that the child's father runs a drug-dealing
operation and forced his son to participate. This information is
relevant in determining whether the juvenile is a threat to public
safety or whether he is a victim of environmental circumstance.
Likewise, a prosecutor should be allowed to establish, for the
purposes of transfer, that a juvenile is especially culpable, such as
where he was the ring-leader of a prior conspiracy to deal drugs. This
contextual analysis does not seek to litigate the merits of the prior
police contacts, but rather provides the necessary background for a
district court judge to determine the most appropriate jurisdiction
over the juvenile. In addition, allowing a contextual analysis can cut
both ways, at times assisting the juvenile defendant and at other times
assisting the prosecutor.
Considering the juvenile's entire delinquency record in context will
aid courts in determining whether an individual poses a threat to
public safety. By limiting the scope of review to adjudicated conduct,
courts minimize the likelihood of accurately identifying the child's
developmental necessities and deficiencies. In United States v.
TLW, for example, the court noted that TLW had been charged
with at least eighteen prior offenses, many of which were never
261. 133 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998); supra notes
232-38 and accompanying text.
262. See Jarrett,133 F.3d at 537.
263. 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); supra notes 241-55 and accompanying text.
264. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 612-13.
265. See id. at 611-12; United States v. John Doe #1, No. 98 CR 438, 1999 WL
642828, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999).
266. 925 F. Supp. 1398 (C.D. I11.1996), affd sub nora., United States v. Wilson, 149
F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
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adjudicated. 67
TLW had only been subject to court-ordered
punishment for traffic offenses."6 The court held that it could
consider arrests and charges that did not result in convictions when
determining whether TLW was an appropriate candidate for
transfer. 69 Without considering these prior police contacts, the
district court would have been unable to assess the danger that TLW
truly posed to society. Regardless of whether the discretionary
decision to transfer TLW was right or wrong, it is apparent that both
the judge and the juvenile can benefit from the presentation of
additional information.
Limiting the scope of review to adjudicated conduct forces courts to
develop mechanisms to evade legislated standards. For example, in
United States v. Anthony Y.,270 the court pointed out:
Even if we limited Anthony Y.'s prior delinquency to the three
adjudicated offenses, the additional conduct considered by the
district court was relevant to several of the other statutory factors,
like 'the age and social background of the juvenile,' 'the juvenile's
present intellectual development and psychological maturity,' or 'the
nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such
efforts.' ... '[T]he plain language of those terms is broad enough to
authorize the admission of evidence regarding almost any action,
criminal or otherwise, the juvenile has taken,' as long as it is
relevant.271
The court thus found a way to admit all prior police contacts even
though it was unsure of whether they were admissible as part of the
juvenile's prior delinquency record. 72 The Eighth Circuit used similar
reasoning in United States v. Juvenile LW02 7 3 when it held that
unadjudicated conduct should be considered in the context of the
other factors delineated by section 5032.274
The purpose of the federal juvenile system is to rehabilitate
juveniles amenable to treatment and to determine an individual
child's best interests.2 175 Though there is little legislative history on the
subject, it seems evident on a basic level that Congress would not have
delineated specific criteria for district court judges to consider if it
intended that courts merge the categories into each other or
267. See id. at 1403.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 1404.
270. 172 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 228 (1999).
271. Id. at 1253 (citation omitted).
272. The District of Oregon followed the Anthony Y. approach in United States v.
One Juvenile Male, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (D. Or. 1999). The court stated that
the statutory factors are broad enough to cover any of the juvenile's relevant previous
conduct. See id. at 1097.
273. 160 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
274. See LWO, 160 F.3d at 1184.
275. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
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manipulate their definitions.276 If, for example, a juvenile shot a
perfect stranger but was never prosecuted, it would be difficult for a
court to find that the action was part of the juvenile's "social
background." If the social background category includes blatantly
delinquent acts, there is no need for a juvenile's prior delinquency
record to be independently reviewed."r In addition to the argument
of textual explicitness, section 5032's delineation of separate criteria
argues against judicial manipulation of the categories in order to reach
an intellectually dishonest result. Whether intended or not, judicial
aggression in making up the content of the criteria leads to
inconsistent analyses and allows judges to skew a transfer decision in
the direction they personally favor.
Although states have historically incorporated transfer provisions
into their juvenile justice statutes,27 waiver was originally intended to
be a last resort for juvenile delinquents.7 9 In both the federal and
state systems, the rehabilitative orientation of juvenile courts still
indicates that judges should not transfer juveniles wvith signs of
rehabilitative potential to adult status.' Waiver has not proven to be
the answer to the juvenile crime problem in America, as higher
juvenile transfer rates have failed to result in a decrease in juvenile
crime.ll Connecticut, for example, has one of the nation's highest
transfer rates, and yet it has nearly the same juvenile homicide rate as
Colorado, which has a transfer rate of nearly zero.' Between 1989
and 1993, the number of juveniles transferred to adult status increased
by 41% nationwide.1 Despite the increased transfer rate, juvenile
homicide arrests in major cities across the nation continue to
increase.? 4

In addition, more juveniles are transferred for non-violent crimes
than for violent ones.3 This illustrates that the transfer process does
not isolate those juveniles who pose the most severe threat to society.
In order for a punitive system to be effective, it must be able to
identify those individuals who require severe punishment. Allowing
276. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).

277. It would be equally inappropriate to consider prior delinquency under

"present intellectual development" or "nature of past treatment" prongs.
278. See supra Part II.A.
279. See Shephard, supra note 152, at 39.

280. See id.
281. The Juvenile homicide arrest rates come from the FBI. See U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1991

tbl. 4.4 (Timothy Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1992).
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report (Aug. 1995).

285. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1996 Update on Violence (Feb. 1996).
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courts to consider all of a juvenile's prior police contacts will aid
judges in determining whether there is hope for treatment. District
court judges should be looking to minimize unnecessary transfers and
effectively pinpoint those individuals who pose an irreversible threat
to society.
Notwithstanding the nation's shift from a rehabilitative to a punitive
system of juvenile justice, 26 courts should determine eligibility for
transfer carefully. Carefully considering the methods by which
juveniles are transferred to adult status is of special importance in
light of increasing crime rates and the correlative failures of the
transfer process. Currently, the number of younger and more
immature juveniles transferred to adult status is rapidly increasing as a
result of punitive reform.'
As of 1995, twelve states had no
minimum age for criminal prosecution.' Between 1984 and 1990, the
number of juveniles annually admitted to adult prisons under state
law increased by 30%.2 9 As of 1995, forty-two states required or
permitted juveniles transferred to adult status to be placed in an adult
jail pending trial. 29° Thus, although the individual juvenile has yet to
be convicted of the alleged offense, he or she is exposed to an
environment proven to be injurious to adolescent development.29 '
Statistics reveal that juveniles in adult prisons are five times more
likely to be victims of sexual assault, 50% more likely to be attacked
with a weapon, and twice as likely to be beaten by prison personnel
than juveniles housed in youth facilities. 2 Courts should therefore
consider a juvenile's prior delinquency record in its entirety and pay
careful attention to the context of prior alleged offenses before
subjecting the juvenile offender to the harsher adult environment.
Legislative changes in waiver statutes that lower the age
requirement for transfer and expand the list of offenses for which a
juvenile can be transferred shift the focus of district courts to the
juvenile's prior delinquency record. 93 When assessing the record
based solely on adjudicated conduct, courts enforce the new punitive
developments of the juvenile court by placing less emphasis on the
individual juvenile. Because the punitive system alone will not solve
the growing juvenile crime rate,29 1 it is important to use the prior
286. See supra Part I.
287. See Eric Lotke, National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, An Analysis
of Juvenile Homicides: Where they Occur and the Effectiveness of Adult Court
Intervention 1 (1996); Grisso, supra note 174, at 5. This increase is placing a strain on
an already overcrowded criminal court system. See Lotke, supra, at 1.
288. Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and
Rehabilitationin the JuvenileJustice System, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1037, 1044 (1995).
289. See Shepherd, supra note 152, at 40.
290. See id. at 41-42.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 42.
293. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 89.
294. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 16, at 324, 361-62.
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delinquency record in a more traditional manner. Courts should
consider all prior police contacts to determine whether the juvenile
poses a threat to public safety and whether the system should abandon
efforts toward rehabilitation. Considering the context of prior events
will lead to a more complete picture of the juvenile's needs and future
prospects.
In order to prevent courts from construing the statute in an
unintended manner, Congress should revise section 5032 to include a
uniform definition of a juvenile's prior delinquency record, and that
definition should include all prior police contacts. 29 Furthermore, the
government and the defense attorney should be permitted to research
the circumstances surrounding prior alleged offenses.
In
implementing these standards, the court will gain a better
understanding of the individual juvenile and will therefore be in a
position to more accurately determine the child's best interests.
District court judges will be less likely to transfer juveniles with
rehabilitative potential, and the system will consequently conform to
the standard set forth in the JJDPA's purpose clause. 29
Admittedly, administrative problems exist with respect to requiring
more information on each case that moves through the system.
Because the time of both prosecutors and defense attorneys is in high
demand and funding is limited, they may not be able to thoroughly
investigate a juvenile's prior conduct.
In addition, lengthy
presentations of evidence and wvitnesses will result in court backlog if
transfer proceedings are turned into mini-trials of each prior police
contact.219 Additional mechanisms, therefore, must be implemented
to provide for efficient accumulation and presentation of information.
While courts can limit the time that attorneys have to brief and argue
circumstances of prior contacts, a more systemic solution would be to
establish a reporting system at each juvenile intake. When taken into
custody, juveniles could be screened by a prosecutor who determines
295. Congressional revision should not stop here. The entire juvenile justice
waiver provision should be revamped to provided district court judges with more
detailed criteria for determining jurisdiction.
296. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. Defining a juvenile's prior
delinquency record to include all prior police contacts will also make the juvenile
justice system more effective. Transcripts of waiver hearings will include more
accurate information on the juvenile defendant because district court judges will
conduct a thorough review of past conduct. Though proceedings are often
confidential, a defendant's name and any other identifying criteria can be redacted. If
there is more accurate information on juvenile delinquents available for review,
legislatures, and juvenile justice organizations will have more comprehensive
materials with which to develop and implement new programs. Agencies will be
more effective in pinpointing where, why, and how juveniles become delinquent.
297. See United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
John Doe #1, No. 98 CR 438, 1999 WL 642828, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999);
United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (C.D. I11.1996), aff'd sub nom., United
States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
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whether to file charges. That prosecutor would then write up an
informational report describing the circumstances of the arrest and
the prosecutor's reasons for either pursuing or dismissing charges.
This intake report could then be placed into the juvenile's file or,
ideally, entered into a national database. When an attorney begins
defending or prosecuting a juvenile in a subsequent waiver hearing,
detailed information about the individual's prior police contacts will
then be available to facilitate a contextual analysis.
In keeping with Congressional intent to construct a juvenile justice
298
system that balances rehabilitative treatment with penal sanctions,
defining a juvenile's prior delinquency record to include all prior
police contacts will create a more uniform process by which to treat
juvenile offenders. In addition, allowing counsel to present a
contextual analysis of a juvenile's prior delinquency record will result
in a more just and effective approach to transfer because juveniles
who appear amenable to rehabilitation will remain in the juvenile
system, and those deserving harsher sanctions will be punished
accordingly. This contextual consideration need not and should not
result in litigation of the merits of prior incidents. Implementing the
proposed intake system to identify those juveniles who are truly
appropriate for waiver will also facilitate identification of those
transfers that are truly in "the interest of justice." Careful screening
will ultimately minimize the number of juveniles who are unjustly
prosecuted as adults.
B. The Future ofJuvenile Justice
In 1997, 2.8 million juveniles were arrested, accounting for one in
every five arrests made across the country.299 Juvenile crime is in the
news, in our communities, in our schools, and for some of us, in our
homes. The long-term solution to juvenile crime in America falls
outside the scope of law enforcement agencies."°
"It requires
strengthening those basic institutions-the family, schools, religious
institutions, and community groups-that are responsible for instilling
values and creating law-abiding citizens.""3 ° In the meantime, juvenile
justice systems require extensive reform. We must strike a balance
between punishing juvenile offenders and treating those juveniles who
are candidates for rehabilitation. Legislators must revise their
298. See, e.g., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The
purpose of the federal juvenile delinquency proceeding is to... encourage treatment
and rehabilitation."); United States v. Dion L., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (D.N.M.
1998) ("The purpose of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act... is to remove

juveniles from the ordinary criminal process and to encourage treatment and
rehabilitation.").
299. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 115-16.
300. See William P. Barr, Recommendations to Strengthen Criminal Justice as it
Relates to Juveniles (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
301. Id.
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budgets to make effective rehabilitation programs available to
juvenile offenders. State and federal governments should also instruct
juvenile justice organizations to develop delinquency prevention
programs based on already existing prediction studies. This will yield
effective mechanisms for early childhood intervention. Finally, judges
conducting juvenile court proceedings should hear from expert
sociologists and psychologists, and should be required to take
continuing legal education classes on issues pertaining to juvenile
justice. These reforms will ensure a better future for America's youth.
While the federal juvenile justice system remains primarily
rehabilitative,3°0 pending legislation proposes to implement increased
punitive changes. The proposed Violent and Repeat Offender
Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999,1 3 for example,
authorizes juveniles fourteen years of age or older to be tried as adults
in federal court with the consent of the U.S. Attorney. The bill
proposes that Congress adopt a reverse waiver provision, similar to
legislation currently in effect in twenty-three states.- This provision
prohibits a court from mandating juvenile jurisdiction unless a juvenile
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that trying him in
Additionally, the bill
juvenile court is in the interest of justice.3
proposes that violent juvenile offenders be held separately from nonviolent juveniles. The proposal also requires the Department of
Justice to establish an Office of Juvenile Crime Control and
Prevention that will, among other things, set forth incentives and
standards for states to formulate prevention programs for at-risk
youths.306
This proposed bill is problematic in several respects. First, while
the bill attempts to create prevention and intervention programs, it
does not account for the difficulties previously encountered in
establishing effective treatment plans. It fails to specify prediction
work that can accurately identify at-risk youths and the treatments
that they need. Additionally, reverse waiver provisions are harsh
jurisdictional requirements that place the burden on the juvenile to
establish amenability to treatment. This burden shift does not
abandon the discretionary transfer process, yet the proposal fails to
more clearly define waiver criteria. Consequently, the provision does
not solve the problems that district court judges face under current
federal law as discussed in this Note. Finally, the proposed reforms
are bundled -with controversial gun legislation.31 The country cannot
302. See United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532,536 (9th Cir. 1996).
303. See Violent and Repeat Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of
1999, H.R. 1501, 106th Cong.
304. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 102.

305. See H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. (1999).
306. See id
307. See id.
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wait for Congress to agree on appropriate standards for the control
and distribution of firearms. Juveniles are in trouble and the system
merits immediate attention.
Recent studies indicate that post-adjudication intervention can be
effective if programs are designed correctly. Based on meta-analysis,
"a quantitative technique for coding, analyzing, and summarizing
research evidence," researchers have delineated criteria that comprise
effective treatment programs.0 8
Specific service types, the
appropriate role of the juvenile justice system, frequency and duration
of treatment, and characteristics of the participating juveniles are all
important considerations in designing effective rehabilitation plans. 309
Meta-analysis illustrates the potential for future reform and supports
the argument for maintaining a juvenile system of justice with
increased resources aimed at rehabilitating young offenders.
While statistics show that courts are beginning to waive more
violent offenders, there remain a large number of non-violent
offenders prosecuted as adults.310 It is difficult to reconcile the waiver
of non-violent cases with the maintenance of a juvenile court
system, 311 because many property, drug, and public order offenders
likely have rehabilitative potential. 311 Limited resources, impatience,
and budget restraints, however, make programs unavailable to young
offenders.1 3 Consequently, transfer decisions may be a reflection of
economic considerations. 31'
Legislatures should consider revising
local and federal budgets to allocate funds toward more effective
308. Mark. W. Lipsey, Can Rehabilitation Programs Reduce the Recidivism of
Juvenile Offenders? An Inquiry into the Effectiveness of PracticalPrograms, 6 Va. J.
Soc. Pol'y & L. 611, 613 (1999).
309. See id. at 632-34. Lipsey's study reveals:
(1) The most effective service types included probation in the form of supervision,
counseling and restitution programs; aftercare in the form of intensive supervision;
community-based, school-sponsored, counseling, academic, and service brokerage
programs.
(2) The most effective role of the juvenile justice system embodied three or more of
the following characteristics: Services were generally not delivered from a law
enforcement facility; juveniles participating in the program were referred by a
juvenile law enforcement agency and attendance was mandatory; services were
administered by juvenile justice personnel instead of teachers, school administrators,
psychiatrists or lay person; the program was sponsored by a juvenile justice agency.
(3) The most effective programs had at least three of the following characteristics: a
minimum of 18 weeks in duration; distinct periodic treatment sessions; a minimum of
five hours per week of treatment; no uncontrolled variation in treatment delivery.
(4) Juveniles with two of the following characteristics were more amenable to
treatment: over 15 years of age; predominantly not a status offender; predominantly
not a property offender. See id.
310. See Jeffrey A. Butts, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Fact Sheet #52, Delinquency Cases Waived to Criminal Court (Feb. 1997).
311. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring
Children to CriminalCourt in CapitalCases, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 447, 486 (1996).
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
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treatment programs.
Prediction studies have also proven to accurately pin-point at-risk
juveniles.315 Investigators have found that certain characteristics of
the child are powerful predictors of future antisocial behavior3 6
Early childhood factors commonly associated with delinquent
behavior include low socioeconomic status, neighborhoods associated
with violence and social disorganization, parental criminality and
substance abuse, low cognitive ability, and exposure to media
violence.3 17

Intervention programs designed around these factors

focus on minimizing their effect, and can prevent later delinquent
behavior.3"8 Successful early childhood intervention programs have
led to the following advantages for program participants: improved
educational processes and outcomes for the child; increased emotional
and cognitive development; improved parent-child relationships;
decreased criminal activity; and enhanced economic self-sufficiency,

initially for the parent and later for the child.31 9 If legislatures focus

their attention on younger children, they may be able to prevent the
onslaught of future delinquency.
Finally, one of the juvenile system's primary aims must be to
prevent delinquents from becoming adult criminals. By considering
all personal and social characteristics without assigning a single factor
controlling significance, individualized justice relies heavily on the
discretion of juvenile court administrators. " Without incorporating
principles of psychology and sociology, there is little chance that
courts will be able to determine the best interests of the juvenile. In
addition, juvenile and district court judges should be required to take
continuing legal education courses in sociological or psychological
juvenile development.
The future of juvenile justice requires us to incorporate both
punitive and rehabilitative mechanisms into state and federal systems.
Neither punishment nor rehabilitation alone have proven effective.
Legislatures must create effective rehabilitation programs based on
meta-analysis that will treat post-adjudication juveniles. Greater
emphasis should be placed on prediction studies and on early
childhood intervention programs in order to minimize the number of
315. See Jennifer L. White et. al., How Early Can We Tell?: Predictors of
Childhood Conduct Disorder and Adolescent Delinquency, 28 Criminology 507

(1990).
316. See id.
317. See Richard E. Tremblay & Wendy M. Craig, Developmental Crime
Prevention, 19 Crime & Just. 151, 158 (1995); Jane Watson, Crime and Juvenile
Delinquency: Time for Early Childhood Intervention, 2 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty
245,248 (1995).

318. See id.
319. See Peter W. Greenwood, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Fact Sheet #94, Costs and Benefits of Early Childhood Intervention (Feb.

1999).
320. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 485-86.
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juveniles that end up in the justice system. Additionally, juvenile
court judges should have access to expert assistance and should be
required to take continuing legal education classes in order to
understand the needs of juvenile defendants. This is especially true in
the federal system where district court judges have no formal training
on delinquency issues.
CONCLUSION
The primary goal of the juvenile justice system should be the
prevention of juvenile crime. Prediction work and early intervention
programs will effectively minimize the number of children who grow
up to be juvenile delinquents. Law enforcement agencies must not,
however, give up on today's youth. We must strike a balance between
rehabilitative and punitive approaches to adjudicating juvenile crime.
We should learn from the past and develop rehabilitation programs
with the potential to effectively treat juvenile offenders.
Simultaneously, we must ensure that the system is taken seriously and
that sanctions are meted out in proportion to the delinquent acts
committed.
Part of this federal reform means that transfer proceedings should
be conducted based on uniform, fair criteria. When juveniles are
inappropriately transferred to adult status they may become subject to
the harsh conditions of adult prisons. Juveniles become prey in a
system characterized by sexual assault, physical abuse, and higher
recidivism rates. Absent Congressional amendment, federal courts
should adopt a uniform definition of a juvenile's prior delinquency
record to include all prior police contacts. This definition will provide
a consistent standard to apply to similarly situated offenders and
prevent inappropriate transfer wherever possible. Furthermore,
federal courts should permit both prosecutors and defense attorneys
to present a contextual analysis of those prior contacts to aid in a
more thoughtful and just waiver decision. While a contextual analysis
increases the subjectivity of the judge's transfer decision, it allows for
a more equitable determination that will further the rehabilitative
goals of the federal juvenile justice system.
To ease the administrative pressures that these requirements will
create, an "intake-prosecutor" should be assigned to each police
station. This individual can evaluate cases as they are brought in to
determine the circumstances of the arrest, the juvenile's participation
in the alleged offense, and the basis for the prosecutorial decision to
charge or dismiss.
This reporting system will provide judges
conducting future transfer proceedings with a more comprehensive
view of the juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation, and will help to
identify those juveniles who are threats to themselves and to society.
While defining a juvenile's prior delinquency record to include all
prior police contacts is only one element in the rehabilitation of
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federal juvenile law, it can provide crucial uniformity and fairness in
an otherwise arbitrary waiver process.

Notes & Observations

